by Navy Capt. Pete O’Brien
George Foreman died the other day, a fantastic athlete and boxer, and by all accounts a good man, may he rest in peace. He is remembered for a number of things, to include how hard he could punch, and of course, his loss to Muhammed Ali in one of the greatest fights of all time: The Rumble in the Jungle, October 30th, 1974 in Kinshasa. Ali won with a knock-out in the 8th round. After an odd first round, Ali had shifted to what he later called “rope-a-dope” and let Foreman punch himself out. Once he was too tired to defend himself, Ali made him pay for his strategic error: wasting punches. If you want to see a great fight, it is, of course, on line; I highly recommend it.
But there’s a lesson: Fighting someone with greater resources can be very difficult. Ali had conditioned himself to take much more punishment than any man had ever taken in a fight. That ability to take a punishment and keep on fighting makes someone very difficult to beat.
As with men, so with countries.
On July 20th, 2022 I made an observation to some friends that it appeared the Russians had taken a page from history and changed tactics (the real credit goes to BH Liddell Hart, the British strategist, in his history of WWII; I was just lucky enough to find it while digging around in an old book). It appeared then, and has since been confirmed ad nauseam, that the Russians, some time in the May-June 2022 time frame changed their approach to the war, adopting a very slow, attrition style of war, one that entailed much less risk, and which focused on attrition (killing) of Ukrainian forces, with the taking of land a secondary issue. While they have had setbacks where they were over-extended (west of the Dnepr, and the poorly set up defenses around Izyum, southeast of Kharkiv), generally, the Russians have been winning since then.
The strategic mistake was that Ukraine accepted the change, Ukraine accepted a war of attrition, and none of her would-be allies talked her out of it. They could have chosen to fight a war of maneuver, refusing attacks, surrendering land, drawing the Russians in deeper and when the Russians did move deeper, cutting them off and destroying them.
But, they didn’t. And, like George Foreman, they found themselves facing a foe with greater assets.
In the jargon of war plans, this is called a “strategic error.” And strategic errors must be paid for.
Paid for it they have. Ukrainian army casualties are said to be on the order of 70,000 KIA, but the actual number is accepted by virtually every source to be much higher, perhaps 125,000 – 150,000, and 350,000+ WIA. Russian army losses are said to be more than 95,000 KIA but this also certainly larger, perhaps also approaching 150,000, with 400,000 – 500,000 WIA.
Of course, Russia has a population of 147 million, and Ukraine has a de facto population (number of people in country) of 30 – 32 million, which makes Ukrainian losses five times the impact of Russian losses.
Further, Ukraine has taken some 12,600 civilian killed, and accumulated some $500 – 600 billion in damage (on a pre-war GDP of $160 billion).
Add to this the 100,000 Ukrainian desertions, and an abysmal Ukrainian fertility rate (1.2 – with replacement rate of 2.1), 4th lowest in the world (Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore are lower), and you have severe short and long-term problems.
But, bad thinking continues to add to the problem.
In an interview earlier this month Bruno Kahl, president of the BND (Bundesbachrichtendienst – Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service) suggested that the answer for Europe is to have Ukraine continue the war until “not before 2029.” If the war ends any sooner than that Russia will, in all likelihood, recover faster than Europe and be able to threaten Europe, Russia could “use its resources faster to pose a threat to Europe.”
Said only slightly differently, fight the war to the last Ukrainian so as to exhaust Russia while Europe engages in a more leisurely defense buildup that won’t damage the European economies; peace now, per Herr Kahl, is not in Europe’s interest.
Maybe that’s why Ukraine’s allies didn’t talk her out of her strategic errors.
Former Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko reacted to Kahl’s statement with a call for an immediate ceasefire and peace agreement.
As I mentioned to some friends earlier this week, much has been made of the idea that Ukraine needs to regain all its territory, that is, Ukraine as of 1991. I asked a smart friend, retired Army infantry, what an army would need to look like to force out the Russians, and reclaim the 1991 borders.
First, he pointed out that the current army pretty much starts where they are, holding the front line. That army is roughly 40 brigades – which represents a combat force of roughly 220,000 – 240,000 troops (50,000 short of desired manning), and combat support and combat service support (the tail to the tooth) forces of about 600,000. Essentially all of these troops would continue doing what they’re doing.
Then, they’ll need an army that can take on the bulk of the Russian army, has enough extra forces to sustain the attack, and has the logistics tail to support a lot of fighting and a lot of movement.
To attack and defeat Russia’s 600,000 troops (100+ brigades and regiments supported by a large tail that disappears into Russia) would call for roughly 500,000 combat troops, and perhaps 1 million combat support and combat service support.
Of course, this is a quick study, but even if this estimate is 40% too large, and they were willing to accept more risk, this still calls for a 300,000 soldiers force, with 600,000 more in the tail – essentially their current army once again.
How long would it take to train such a force – from drafting through basic training, weapons training, small unit training, and on up through multi-brigade level training? Depending on your standards, and assuming everything went well, 12-18 months; longer if there are any problems.
And where would it be done?
And where are these extra weapons and systems coming from?
And how does Ukraine sustain itself while all this is taking place?
And finally, where is Ukraine going to get 1 million or more military age men while also trying to function as a country?
And is Russia likely to let its army be wiped out? Or would a real red line finally be crossed?
Every war can be won, every war can be lost, by either side. And will is the foundation of all. But, plans and expectations have to be consistent with capabilities.
Ukraine, like George Foreman in Kinshasa, has put up a great fight. But the country is slowly breaking. And European politicians are playing Real Politik with Ukrainian lives while there is little chance of success. Ukraine has already paid the price of several grave strategic errors. Maybe Tymoshenko is right.ReplyReply allForward
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