by Navy Capt. (Ret) Peter O’Brien
President Zelenskyy has now briefed President Biden, former President Trump, Vice President Harris, most of the heads of state of Europe, and the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) on his Victory Plan. He commented that if the plan were implemented “the war would end in 2025.”
The plan contains 5 main elements, listed below, with a relevant comment from President Zelenskyy:
1) Formal NATO membership
“The fact of inviting Ukraine to NATO can become really fundamental for peace. We understand that membership in NATO is a question of the future, not the present. But Putin must see that his geopolitical calculations are losing.”
2) Persuading Western allies to lift a ban on use of long-range weapons
“This is an irreversible strengthening of Ukrainian defense against the aggressor. It is realistic to defend our positions on the battlefield in Ukraine and at the same time necessarily return the war to the territory of Russia. So that the Russians feel what war is.”
3) Deterring Russian aggression
“Ukraine proposes to deploy on its land a comprehensive, non-nuclear strategic deterrence package that will be sufficient to protect Ukraine from any military threat from Russia and that will maximally narrow the range of Russian actions to such prospects – or join an honest diplomatic process for a just end to the war, or guaranteed to lose the opportunity to continue an aggressive war as a result of the use by Ukraine of the provided deterrence package in accordance with Russia’s defined military targets.”
4) Strengthening the economy
“Ukraine offers the United States together with certain partners, in particular the European Union, of which Ukraine will be a part, and with other partners in the world who are our partners, to conclude a special agreement on the joint protection of critical resources available in Ukraine, joint investment and the use of the corresponding economic potential.”
5) Improving future security
“This Ukrainian experience should be used to strengthen the defense of the entire Alliance and guarantee security in Europe. This is a worthy mission for our heroes. We envisage, if the partners agree, to replace certain military contingents of the US Armed Forces, which are stationed in Europe, with Ukrainian units.”
There also also 3 secret appendices, which, I would guess, are: a list of specific type and qualities of weapons for #2, specific targets to be addressed by those weapons, and the necessary weapons ands systems for #3. There would also presumably be some effort made by NATO to actively assist in defense of Ukrainian air space.
The central argument is that NATO states agreeing to such a plan would constitute a de facto statement that NATO is simply not going to let Russia win. This, on top of the impact of deep strikes on Russian infrastructure and certain “strategic” targets, would provide Russia the incentive to stop the war.
Would it work?
When Russia kicked off this war in February 2022 they did so based on a massively flawed assessment of Ukraine and how Ukraine would respond to an attack. However, by July the Russians were changing their operations, shifting to a style of fighting reminiscent of the Soviet army following the battle of Kursk, a style of fighting that was based, at its root, on attrition.
The British strategist BH Liddell Hart described the Russian Army’s style of fighting after Kursk this way:
The pattern, and rhythm…alternating series of strokes at different points, each temporarily suspended when its impetus waned in face of stiffening resistance, each so aimed as to pave the way for the next, and all timed to react on one another.
This is the natural method for an army which is limited in mobility but possesses a general superiority of force. It is all the more suitable when and where the lateral communications are too sparse to make it possible to switch reserves quickly from one sector to another to back up a particular success. As it means breaking into a fresh front each time, the cost of this ‘broad’ exploitation tends to be higher than with a ‘deep’ exploitation. It is also less likely to be quickly decisive, but the end may be surer, provided that the army which applies it has an adequate balance of material superiority to maintain the process.
In that offensive process the Russian losses were naturally heavier than the Germans, but the Germans lost more than they could afford… For them attrition spells ruin…unwillingness to sanction any long step-back retarded their retreat but hastened their exhaustion.
If the Ukrainian army was going to defeat the Russians they needed to do something different than match attrition with attrition – step back, prepare solid defenses further to the rear, give ground to gain advantage. Like the Germans, they have been unwilling to give ground to gain advantage.
The result has been very high losses. While Russian losses are high, the fact is that Ukrainian losses are nearly as high (and may well be higher), but the Russian population is 4 times that of Ukraine’s.
Still, Putin has not been willing to engage in a full mobilization; Ukraine mobilized within days of the start of the war. This led to the obvious observation that for Russia to win, Putin needed to solve his manpower problem. Either Putin needed to mobilize, or he needed some other source of troops.
And now he may have found it.
This past week the Republic Of Korea (ROK) National Intelligence Service reported that North Korean troops are being provided to Russia and will soon be available for service in Ukraine, with the current estimate being 12,000 combat troops, or roughly 1 infantry division.
While some have said it demonstrates that Russia is losing the manpower fight, that Putin is now begging allies for troops, I think the opposite can be argued: Russia will get troops – at a lower personnel cost, without having to conduct a full mobilization, and both dictators will be pleased: Putin has troops for the cost of some oil and some grain, if they are killed there is little political blowback, and unlike an armed force like the Wagner Group, they present no threat to him.
It is worth noting that the reporting out of Ukraine is that morale is very poor and getting worse and that Ukraine is using press gangs to round up men for the army.
Add to that story the figure from Kyiv that 100,000 soldiers have deserted from the army – a 7.7% desertion rate. The worst US desertion rate during Vietnam was 1971, at 3.3%.
And when the Polish Ministry of Defense tried to create a Polish Ukrainian Legion, and train up several brigades of Ukrainian men form the 800,000 military age Ukrainian men in Europe, fewer than 200 men across Europe expressed interest.
So, it would seem that Ukrainian morale is poor, and their manpower issues are as great or perhaps greater than Russia’s.
So, where does this leave any plan – or hope – for victory?
- There is little to suggest Putin will quit the war based simply on a demonstration of commitment. Rather, it would seem that there would need to be a substantive NATO escalation, at a minimum. And that would be as likely to lead him to escalate in response.
- If the North Korean division performs well, I suspect we will see a larger force; there is no down-side for the North Koreans and, as one of my astute readers noted, the North Koreans probably would view this as an opportunity to get some real combat experience. If so, Russia’s position would definitely improve on the battlefield.
- If the NK division gives poor to negative results, Putin will continue with his current army recruiting efforts and slowly continue to expand his army, and keep grinding on the Ukrainians. Either way, the Ukrainians are making the same mistake the Germans made – refusing to trade ground for better fighting positions.
- Russia’s economy will not collapse (nor will China’s). The one tactic that might help would be to provide tax incentives and other incentives to US oil, gas and agricultural sectors and drive down the price of energy, fertilizers and grains and deprive Russia of some cash.
Said differently, I’m not sure that the Zelenskyy Victory Plan has much chance for success unless NATO were to step in and add to it with a real force presence, an escalation, with all the concomitant risks. And there is little reason to believe NATO wants to do that.
The war may end in 2025, but it is difficult to imagine that the plan – without a substantive NATO escalation – would provide that impetus. Short of some sort of Deus ex Machina solution, I think we are in for another long year..ReplyReply allForward
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