by Navy Capt (Ret) Peter O’Brien
The Navy has bought the last F-18s; they will be delivered in 2026. That’s of note as the Navy – the Nation – lost one today, shot down by a US Navy ship.
Thankfully, the aircrew survived with only minor injuries.
Meanwhile, the administration continues to use Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to send weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. While these two may not appear to be related, they are.
The problem is shared by our allies: The Royal Navy just announced they’ll retire and sell for scrap the two Albion class amphibious assault ships. These two ships, commissioned in 2003, should have remained in service until at least 2033, when they were to be replaced by the “Multi Role Support Ships,” which were to enter service in the 2030s. But that class was placed in limbo in 2021 and after several other attempts, that were also canceled, only this year was initial planning funded, with delivery in 2034.
We aren’t much better off; US shipbuilding capacity has shrunk, yearly aircraft purchases have shrunk, and we’ve shipped off billions of dollars in ordnance to Ukraine without the actual production capacity to rapidly refill our ammo dumps. Europe has in large part done the same thing – and their stockpiles weren’t in as healthy a state as were US stockpiles to begin with.
We are burning the candle at both ends; we need to change the plan.
Inside DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP – created in 1978) is, among other things, responsible for formulating national security strategy for the SecDef; the US used to engage in very good long range planning.
US planning to fight Japan began under President Roosevelt – Theodore Roosevelt, in 1906. Planning for the fight against Hitler began by the time Hitler had solidified his hold on power in Germany in 1934.
One of many items worked out was how big an Army and Navy could the US field?
In 1940 the US had a population of about 132 million and there were fewer than 460,000 in uniform. By 1945 there were 12.2 million in uniform. The US army stood up 91 divisions (some were purely administrative), and the Marines had 6 divisions. But, by 1945, even as the Army planned the invasion of Japan, it was clear we couldn’t long sustain this percentage of the population in uniform. The following several decades bore that out – despite surges during the Korean War and Vietnam War.
Said differently, a nation can sustain a certain percent of the population in uniform while also sustaining industry and agriculture, but that number is fairly small and smaller still as time drags on. And as weapons have become more complex and training has become longer and more difficult, the percentage continues to decrease.
How big an active military can a modern nation sustain for more than perhaps 3 years as a percentage of the population? For a country as wealthy, and as heavily automated as the US, that number is still below 3%. A US military comprising 3% of the population would still see 10 million citizens in uniform, a number that is clearly too big for the US to sustain. For countries with less money – assuming they are not a dictatorship where people just have to obey (North Korea), that number is smaller. North Korea’s case is instructive: with a population of 27 million, it has an active force of 1.3 million – not quite 5%, and for the bulk of that army, their training is simplistic at best. (Note, North Korea also maintains a reserve force of 500,000 and a “para military” units numbering 6 million, but North Korea is separate case.)
Long and short, a uniformed military of 5% of the population is exceptionally expensive to the rest of a country, and is in addition, demographically difficult to sustain.
Now consider all that in this light:
A few hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, Japanese forces began their attack on the Philippines. Eventually, US and Philippine forces tried to hold the line on the Bataan peninsula and the island of Corregidor.
In Washington, in the immediate wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor, brand new Brigadier Eisenhower was transferred to the Army Staff. Gen. Marshall asked Eisenhower for an assessment of the situation in the Philippines. Eisenhower came back to Marshal (first week of January 1942) with the conclusion that there was no possibility of relieving the forces in the Philippines, and that further, using assets to attempt relief would be a waste of those assets, and that would prolong the war. Marshall agreed. And, while MG Patrick Hurley (Secretary of War under Hoover) was sent to Australia with $10 million in cash to do what he could, Marshall and Eisenhower knew it would not succeed; the effort was more to show that something was being done for morale purposes rather than a meaningful attempt to rectify the situation, which they knew could not be rectified.
The key to all this was an accurate assessment of reality: the size and disposition of Japanese forces, US forces, Philippine forces, the availability of relief forces, weapons, aircraft, ammo etc., the availability of ships to get the supplies there, the probability of getting the supplies past the Japanese Navy, etc., etc. Marshall and Eisenhower had accurate enough data to make an accurate assessment.
This is what’s missing in the discourse on Ukraine; What are the real casualty figures, both in Ukraine and Russia? What’s the real manpower pool for future recruitment and training? What are the weapons stockpiles and current and future weapon production rates? We know to a certainty the publicized casualty numbers – Russian and Ukrainian, are heavily manipulated for propaganda effect. We know both sides have had problems with recruitment. We know both sides have gone through tremendous amounts of ammunition and other supplies; we know both economies are under great strain.
Where does that leave Ukraine and the West? Much where Marshall was in January of 1942: in need of an accurate assessment of what can and can’t be done. Russia’s economy is now experiencing heightened inflation. But the #1 threat to Russia’s economy – low energy prices – has not been pursued for more than 3 years. Russian ESPO crude now sells at a premium to Brent crude. Is it likely that Russia’s economy is going to break in the next 12-24 months?
Recognizing that Russia has nearly 5 times as many people as Ukraine, and that, apart from propaganda, Ukraine and Russia have probably suffered similar numbers of casualties, attrition warfare for another year or two might not be the best strategy; only with the real numbers can accurate answers be generated. That’s what the next administration needs: an Eisenhower like effort at USDP to make an honest assessment of what’s possible and what isn’t, both in Ukraine, and around the world, given US ship, aircraft, weapons and ammo production rates.
The Ukrainian military, the Russian military, the respective GDPs, the respective populations… What is possible? What is needed? The new SecDef, and the new President need hard answers, not hopes and dreams and wishful thinking: what is an achievable and sustainable end state and how can we get there?
