by Navy Capt. (Ret) Pete O’Brien
Poor Enid Loopner… It appears she moved to Europe…
There is, of course, no Army of the EU. And though there has been a good deal of talk about it from time to time, there is not likely to be an army of the European Union. But, as we struggle with what to do about Russia and Ukraine and how the US should use its many – but nevertheless limited – assets to address the Pacific, it might be instructive to go back to some basics.
I read somewhere that the Russian army has 120 brigades or regiments involved in the war in Ukraine. When direct support assets are added, the total force in and around Ukraine totals roughly 700,000 troops. This constitutes a large percentage of their army – perhaps half. Russia has 1,500,000 in uniform, with a reserve force of 2,000,000, but that includes everybody, to include units scattered all across Siberia.
For reference, Ukraine has an army of roughly 1,250,000 and roughly 100 brigades (though about half their brigades are not forward).
But, disregarding Ukraine, what size army might the EU possess? Looking simply at what they already have in uniform, it turns out the EU has some 1,300,000 in uniform, plus 1,750,000 reserves. Comparing their already existing assets to Russia’s show some interesting numbers (none of this addresses readiness, EU readiness is reportedly abysmal – or in Russia’s case, the number that have been damaged and are being rebuilt, etc.):
Tanks EU – 4,300 Russia – 12,000
IFVs EU – 32,200 Russia – 13,000
Artillery EU – 8,100 Russia – 22,5000
Strike aircraft EU – 1,450 Russia – 641 (includes bombers)
Further, there’s this: the GDP of the countries in the EU is $20 Trillion, while that of Russia is $2.2 trillion. And the EU population is 449 million, Russia’s 147 million.
With 3 times the population, and 9 times the GDP, shouldn’t the EU be able to deal with Russia? Particularly, as I’ve read several times in the past week, Russia is already losing the war. Hmmm…
In 2022 Russia invaded Ukraine with every expectation that the government would roll over and quit. It was one of the worst intelligence assessments of the past 100 years. Not only were they convinced there would be no fight, Russia streamed into north-east Ukraine, and into southern Ukraine, and promptly over-extended themselves.
But the Russians then pulled off something very difficult: they corrected that massive strategic mistake. They had a poor strategy when they started (based on that horrible net assessment) but they changed. They began to fix it in late spring of 2022 and it took them almost a year – but they did it. Did they lose ground? Indeed – they were badly over-extended. They had crossed the Dnepr River and tried to take Nikolaev (Mykolaiv) and failed, and then over the course of 2022 lost their lodgment west of the Dnepr, and a large slice of terrain around Kharkiv and Sumy.
But by the end of 2022 they had changed the war into a true war of attrition: the goal was not – and today is not – to simply grab land; the goal on a day-to-day basis is to inflict casualties.
The British strategist BH Liddell Hart described it perfectly, as it is just what the Soviet army did in response to the German offensive of the summer of 1943: a series of slow, alternating counter-offensives, designed for an army with limited mobility. It was (and has proven to be), as Liddell Hart said: “less likely to be decisive, but in the end, may be surer…” Slow and ponderous, high casualties, but low risk.
It’s truly attrition warfare and losses have been tremendous. But the Ukrainian high command accepted attrition against a much larger nation. And despite the propaganda, the losses on both sides are about the same. For a nation with 1/5th the population, that’s a dangerous problem.
But wait, what about Europe?
On paper Europe should be able to readily face Russia and push them out of Ukraine. Particularly when it’s noted that Ukraine has been, even though losing, still performing credibly. If Ukraine were actively teamed with the possible military support from an alliance the size of Europe, certainly they could manhandle Russia.
Except for two things, and they are deeply woven together.
One is the nuclear weapons issue, specifically, Russia’s 5,000 weapon nuclear arsenal. Despite many, to include senior members of the Biden administration, insisting there was no meaningful chance of Russian use, in fact, as the New York Times expose pointed out, it was a nearly daily concern to the administration.
Nor, despite assurances of would-be experts, can anyone forecast when Putin would use nuclear weapons. Use is predicated on his perception of an “existential threat” to Russia. Putin, and Putin alone, knows how he defines that term
And the second issue is will. As Clausewitz points out, in the end war is a struggle of will. And for all intents and purposes, Europe has none. There are all sorts of indicators that that is so…
Consider this: On May 6th, 5 days ago as I write this, 3 years and 2 months after the start of the war, the EU has finally produced a plan on how to end the importation of Russian natural gas. Let me say that another way, 50 months into the war, Europe is still importing energy from Russia, at a rate of $2 billion per month for all of 2024.
This “bold” plan will end European purchase of Russian gas by December 2027.
Put this in perspective: imagine England buying oil or some other key commodity from Germany 50 months after the war started (so, November 1942), with a goal of ending purchases from Germany by the end of May 1945 – when the war was in fact over. No backbone, no will.
It would seem that Europe, like Mr. Loopner, has no spine. And Putin knows it.
