by Navy Capt. (Ret.) Peter O’Brien
There is an old adage that “Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics.” And with that, a tip of the hat to an Army Major who offered some professional comments on a very real Navy and Maritime problem, that is, on the need for immediately addressing of the critical state of US maritime industry – from A to Z. Well done, Major Hegseth. Someone should place you in charge. His comments stand in stark contrast to the commentary that flows from some in the US Navy.
This past week an article was published in one of the journals that covers all things military, a brief discussion on lessons learned by the Navy after more than a year of knocking down missiles over the Red Sea.
The admirals noted that there were several things they learned since the Houthis began firing missiles at ships in the Red Sea – in the fall of 2023 – 15 months ago. The admirals have three “lessons learned” that they discussed, albeit briefly: accountability, transparency and faster learning.
Transparency is the ability of ships in port in the US to see, within hours of an engagement, everything that the ship had on the engagement: to “review the tapes,” as one put it. From this they move to “faster learning,” a more rapid adjustment to training. It wasn’t clear to me exactly what they meant by accountability
Such an opportunity missed. First, focusing on learning how to shoot down missiles is “necessary but not sufficient” knowledge. Of course we want to know how to shoot own missiles. But much like shooting down an arrow, the right questions address the fellow shooting the arrows.
It is also of note that the Navy has used 120 x SM-2 missiles ($2 million each), 80 x SM-6 (about $4 million each), 20 x Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) ($2 million each) and SM-3 ($11 million each) missiles. The cost is not the issue, however. Defending a ship and is crew is the first issue. But what is important is the replacement rate. The Navy bought 125 x SM-6 missiles per year for the last several years. The Navy faces a 4th rate power in Yemen and yet we have used more than half a year’s production run on SM-6 missiles.
War in Ukraine demonstrates how rapidly a larger scale war consumes ordnance.
Further, consider the entire Houthi mess. The Houthis movement, a Zaydi Shia movement, found mainly in Yemen, has for more than 20 years been quite outspoken in its attitude towards the US, Israel, and Jews. The Houthis are a slice of the Zaydis that follows the Koran and rejects “interpretations,” and also call for rule by descendants of Mohammed. At the same time they have at times allowed others – Yemeni nationalists – to join the movement. Nevertheless, their flag and motto seems to suggest a certain world view: الله أكبر، الموت لأمريكا، الموت لإسرائيل، اللعنة علی اليهود، النصر للإسلام,
(Allāhu ʾakbar, al-mawt li-ʾAmrīkā, al-mawt li-ʾIsrāʾīl, al-laʿnah ʿalā ‘l-Yahūd, an-naṣr li-l-ʾIslām)
Which translates to: “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Damn the Jews, Victory to Islam.”
Not that a bunch radicals simply yelling a foul slogan warrants the US Navy doing something, but… In 2011 a civil war stirred up again in Yemen and the Houthis joined in. Fighting has been going on – with the occasional break – since then.
And they have been a threat to freedom of navigation since then.
In fact, the Houthis have been lobbing missiles out into the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden for quite a while. On October 1st, 2016, the Houthis nearly sank a ship under the UAE flag. That ship was a former US Navy ship, the former HSV (High Speed Vessel) Swift. The USS then used Tomahawk missiles to destroy a radar site. On October 9th and again on October 12th, 2016, Houthi forces fired missiles at USS Mason and USS Ponce. Several missiles failed to guid, several missiles were shot down.
The point is that this war has been going on for quite some time, has been threatening sea lanes for quite some time, and the US Navy, and Central Command, and the Joint Staff, have does precious little to stop it.
Meanwhile, Iran keeps supplying the Houthis with weapons. We have conducted some strikes but, as one 3-star officer noted after one series of strikes: we hit at night to minimize casualties. Here’s a news flash: the buildings aren’t attacking anyone.
Consider what the Israeli Air Force did to Hezballah in several months: they flew 12,500 sorties into south Lebanon, they destroyed tens of thousands of Hezbollah missiles, they cut off the Iranian supply of weapons to Hezballah and they eliminated a significant percentage of Hezbollah itself. Hezbollah had – prior to the Israeli war against them during 2024, roughly 100,000 fighters – about the same number as Houthi fighters.
What could the US Navy do? To start:
First: blockade the ports, nothing in, nothing out. No more missiles.
Second, close the air space. A notice to the entire world that any and all aircraft will be shot down, even the daily qat flights.
Third, park 2 aircraft carriers strike groups and 2 expeditionary strike groups (each with a Marine MEU) off the coast and direct them to destroy the Houthis. Two aircraft carriers and two MEUs could comfortably generate 150 sorties per day, to include regular “no-fly” days for maintenance and resupply, and still generate a total of 4,000 strikes per month, or 20,000 sorties in five months, a 60% increase over what the Israelis flew against Hezballah. And the Marines would stand by to conduct some raids ashore.
Another lesson that should have been learned is the need for destroyer tenders – large ships equipped to provide reloading, refueling and periodic maintenance to surface ships – away from port. A destroyer tender anchored in Sallalah or Jedda or Yanbu or any of several Egyptian Red Sea ports would substantially improve the sustainability of ships in the Red Sea. The Navy has no more destroyer tenders.
All this should have been explained to each of the last three Presidents. This isn’t the failure of politicians who know little or nothing about naval operations; it’s a failure of the admirals to understand naval problems and then offer naval solutions.
Meanwhile, the admirals talk tactics.
